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I. Background of the Dissertation 
1. Abstract 
Investment, particularly cross-border investment, is an unavoidable aspect of many economic sec-
tors. Many countries lack the necessary domestic capital to fund their own business ventures, and 
thus require outside sources to finance their private sector. However, these same countries (most of 
which are former Eastern Bloc countries and developing countries) can often be prone to instability, 
internal divisions and sudden changes of policy by the country’s highest authorities. During the 20th 
century, many examples of countries nationalizing industries or expropriating specific businesses 
can be observed.  Domestic regulations and limits on such activities do not always suffice. Domes-
tic law, after all, can always be changed to suit the whims of the current leadership. Given that 
cross-border investment typically involves a very substantial amount of capital, foreign investment 
is a massive risk for investors. 
Hence, a need developed to provide a more substantial form of protection, especially through in-
ternational investment treaties. In the author’s particular case, the investment treaty in question is 
the Energy Charter Treaty, a highly influential agreement concerning the energy sector. The Energy 
Charter Treaty emerged after the end of the Cold War in the 1990’s and came into force on April 12, 
1998. During that time, European states found that they had robust economies, but lacked energy 
resources, while Russia and other post-Soviet states had energy resources, but lacked investment to 
rebuild their economy. Developing nations had a desire to modernize their energy sector while en-
ergy resources were and are one of the few sources of reliable, direct, foreign currency for these 
countries. This created the need for a new, mutual energy- and capital-based relationship, and so an 
international framework regulating foreign energy investment in this field of economy was deemed 
necessary to achieve this. 
There were some precedents to this treaty. These precedents include the European Energy Charter. 
Its signing finally happened on 17 December 1991 in The Hague which showed a remarkably rapid 
pace of negotiations. The Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers’ call was only in 1990, and yet the Com-
mission finished its proposal, the European Union called its conference, and already a resolution of 
sorts was reached in a year’s time. However, it must be stressed that this was a non-binding agree-
ment that contained a set of guidelines, protocols as well as signposts, for the negotiation of the fu-
ture Energy Charter Treaty. Despite it having only 15 signatories and being a non-binding agree-
ment consisting of mostly polity goals and general goodwill, the Charter foreshadowed the in-
creased negotiations to develop a more comprehensive and universal energy charter. Seeking to ex-
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pand the protections of the Energy Charter to countries outside of Europe, these signatories began 
negotiating for a broader agreement that would include more nations. Much of the provisions in the 
European Energy Charter are included in the Energy Charter Treaty. Based on the latter mentioned 
the European Energy Charter can be considered the immediate predecessor of the Energy Charter 
Treaty. Despite its lax and ultimately non-binding nature, lack of precise rules, and being mostly 
based on hazy expressions of interest in further cooperation for mutual prosperity, the European En-
ergy Charter can still be considered an important milestone, a landmark for the development of co-
operation in the field of energy and investment. 
Formal negotiations for the Energy Charter Treaty began in 1992, as some negotiation al-ready took 
place by the time of the signing of the non-binding European Energy Charter. The negotiating 
process was hampered by numerous struggles and problems, such as different perspectives between 
Western and Eastern countries, as well as differing opinions and conflicts within the OECD mem-
bership itself. All of these conflicts significantly lengthened the negotiation period. 
In general, the goal of the Energy Charter Treaty is to provide a comprehensive and holistic legal 
framework for the production, transport, and delivery of energy products. It is a synthesis of what 
bilateral energy treaties were trying to achieve in the first place, such as definitions of what an in-
vestor is, safeguard clauses, and the proper method of settling disputes. This synthesis allows it to 
achieve a uniquely important position when it comes to energy-related investments. 
It is also necessary to address the International Energy Charter. This 2015 treaty belongs to the 
same ‘family’ as the Energy Charter Treaty. However, this was mainly a political declaration, and 
not a proper, extensive treaty like the Energy Charter Treaty. It is not considered legally binding, 
and mostly contains declarations of intent. As such, the author felt it unnecessary to focus on it, 
since the provisions with actual, observable and quantifiable real-world effects are the provisions of 
the Energy Charter Treaty. 
The particular focus of this research is thus the Energy Charter Treaty and the related case law. In 
studying this, the author used a wide variety of methods and examined the theoretical and practical 
(such as case law) aspects of the treaty’s investment protection segments thoroughly. The objective 
being to uncover the treaty’s potential application to Iraq by measuring its comprehensiveness, ad-
vantageousness and efficacy. 
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2. Identification of research tasks 
Based on the aforementioned goal of exploring the comprehensiveness, advantageousness and effi-
cacy of the Energy Charter Treaty, the author sought to answer three specific research questions: 
• Whether the Energy Charter Treaty guarantees the protection of foreign investments, and if 
so, to what extent? 
• Whether the compensation paid under the Energy Charter Treaty is comparable to in-
ternational practice? 
• Whether the Energy Charter Treaty has a “regulatory chill” effect? 
The author formulated these based on the following logic. The fundamental issue that the author 
needed to first establish is that what guarantees for foreign investments exist in the Energy Charter 
Treaty and what is the extent of these. Without answering this question, the author could not 
progress to further examination. After establishing the fundaments, the author moved onto specifics, 
to be precise, compensation, which is likely the chief concern of any foreign investor. Besides the 
text of the treaty, the author also determined that it is necessary to analyze general international 
practice on compensation in investor-state disputes, in order to determine whether the Energy Char-
ter Treaty’s theoretical framework and extant case law shows a durable system of compensation or 
not. Finally, the specter of the so-called “regulatory chill” needed to be addressed. In the past ten 
years or so, investment-related international agreements have been increasingly accused of causing 
this supposed effect, and so the author determined that this too should be discussed as the final re-
search question of the thesis. 
However, there was also need for establishing a more general, all-encompassing foundation for 
these research question. Thus, the author identified the necessity of examining the Energy Charter 
Treaty’s history, evolution, aims and membership, as well as its specific provisions (especially with 
regards to expropriation). Furthermore, the significant body of case law around the Energy Charter 
Treaty could also not be ignored. Not to mention the horizontal issues surrounding energy-exporting 
countries. Only following all this data was collected and processed, could the author turn to answer-
ing the questions. Finally, after the questions have been answered, it is necessary to study their ap-
plicability to Iraq. 
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3. Reasons for doing research work in the field / Aims of the research 
The Energy Charter Treaty is undoubtedly a well-established treaty, a gold standard of the energy 
sector from the perspective of investment protection at the very least, so there needs to be some jus-
tification for its further research, as the literature surrounding it is quite well-established. This justi-
fication is based on a specific perspective, connected to the author’s personal background. 
In recent years, the author’s home country of Iraq, and specifically the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, 
has been attempting to modernize its energy industry and fostering its participation in energy trade. 
Iraq occupies a prominent place as one of the most important oil exporters in the world, ranking 3rd 
in crude oil exports worldwide. However, it is also a country with a difficult political climate, 
fraught with tension, and as explained in the beginning of the dissertation, one that could signifi-
cantly benefit from foreign investment in their energy sector and infrastructure. After the fall of the 
pre-2003 regime, Iraq stands at the crossroads, as internal conflict and disagreements hamper efforts 
to rebuild and modernize. Due to the political situation, Iraq is also strongly in the United States of 
America sphere of influence, and this has an undeniable effect on domestic politics and economic 
policies as well. The best way to accomplish its economic objectives is undoubtedly through foreign 
capital. However, most foreign investors can be difficult to attract, and require several guarantees 
before they are willing to invest in the target country, due to their cautiousness. Domestic guaran-
tees are easily revoked, therefore the author believes that international agreements would be the 
most efficient way of accomplishing this. 
Iraq, is not a contracting party of the Energy Charter Treaty. Therefore, the author believes it is im-
portant to examine the Energy Charter Treaty based on the above, to determine whether it would be 
beneficial for his country to adopt it, as part of the country’s transition into being a more open 
economy, with closer ties to the world market, especially in energy. Another reason for this research 
is that the author’s home region, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, is heavily reliant on Turkey as a 
transit country for exporting their energy resources. The author wished to examine whether the 
adoption of the Energy Charter Treaty (of which Turkey is a signatory party), would help stabilize 
energy relations. The Kurdistan Region is also an autonomous region in Iraq, and an area which 
could also significantly benefit from accession to the Energy Charter Treaty. Foreign investment 
attracted to the region could fuel an economic boom, which would ensure a steady increase in the 
economic sustainability. Due to the nature of legal framework and political agreements in Iraq, the 
Kurdistan Region is permitted to establish its own investment law regime. It has done it in 2006, 
and it is an important factor from the perspective of foreign investors. However, as noted in supra, 
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domestic guarantees are usually insufficient for foreign investors before they are willing to take the 
risk of investing in a host country. Thus, given this domestic situation, becoming a part of the Ener-
gy Charter Treaty would further help with the stability of the country. Foreign investors look for 
stability when deciding where to make their investments, and through the Energy Charter Treaty, 
Iraq could reinforce the image of stability. Therefore, the Energy Charter Treaty would make Iraq 
more attractive to foreign investments, and thus help in the development of the country towards a 
more prosperous future. Regarding the issue of transit, the author decided  to focus his work purely 
on the investment aspects of the treaty as detailed above, due to transit having its own expansive 
body of practice and theory, which would thus be beyond the scope of the thesis. 
Furthermore, as for the location of the author’s research, it can easily be connected to Hungary. 
Hungary is member of the Treaty and it might happen that Hungary will seek alternatives to Russ-
ian natural gas. In this case, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq could provide an ample source of natural 
gas. However, these pipelines would naturally have to cross Turkey, which raises another transit 
issue that could be potentially solved through the Energy Charter Treaty. 
4. Methodology 
Regarding methodology, the author focused on using qualitative research. That is instead of raw 
numbers and measures, the author’s focus has been on examining and detailing the specific theoret-
ical and practical aspects of his subject, in order to establish the necessary background for drawing 
conclusions about the above-mentioned central premise. To list a few examples of his used sub-
methodologies, the author used the historical method, as he considered it important to examine the 
historical background of the Energy Charter Treaty. In particular, he looked at the precedents of the 
Energy Charter Treaty, their formation, how the Energy Charter Treaty itself came to being, how it 
evolved after coming into force and what issues it faced since then. This was something the author 
believed to be quintessential to his dissertation, that it was a necessity in order to understand the 
real goals behind the establishment of the Treaty and the challenges facing it from its inception to 
its present. Thus, the author would be able to demonstrate how it developed and evolved over time. 
Secondly, the author used descriptive methods. In subjects such as investment, investor, foreign in-
vestment, expropriation, compensation and dispute settlement, it was necessary for the logical struc-
ture of the author’s research to describe these subjects in precise details. Besides the Energy Charter 
Treaty, the author also looked at other relatable definitions and concepts as defined by other 
 6
sources. This provided an opportunity to demonstrate differences and similarities between how gen-
eral international thought, other treaties and the Energy Charter Treaty defined these subjects. For 
the purposes of the research, the author did not consider it necessary to indulge in a true compara-
tive analysis, but that the different interpretations as demonstrated should serve the reader well 
enough in understanding the fundaments of the subject matter at hand. However, the emphasis was 
fixed on the Energy Charter Treaty’s interpretation, as per the central premise of measuring its 
comprehensiveness, advantageousness and efficacy from the perspective of Iraq. 
Furthermore, the author relied on the analytical method to determine and understand the critical 
problems and issues of the Energy Charter Treaty (in relation to investment protection, of course), 
and whether it would be beneficial for Iraq to adopt the Energy Charter Treaty and whether such a 
treaty benefits energy exporting countries or not. In relation to this, the author undertook the analy-
sis of several energy exporting countries, from the perspective of the Energy Charter Treaty, includ-
ing Iraq itself. 
Moving on, the author also examined the case law surrounding the Energy Charter Treaty. This, 
both showed him the general practice, and allowed him to demonstrate the common issues and 
questions surrounding the investment protection aspect of the Energy Charter Treaty. In particular, 
the author examined all available case law related to Articles 10 and 13 of the Energy Charter 
Treaty, so the focus was on expropriation from the perspective of cases. 
Based on this case law, the author engaged in a bit of a conceptual research about why foreign in-
vestors sue host countries under the Energy Charter Treaty. 
On a lesser note, the author also used a some quantitative research, regarding the issue of compen-
sation in international practice, where he examined various statistics in order to compare compensa-
tion sums under the Energy Charter Treaty with compensation sums under other treaties and general 
international investment practice. 
5. Terminology 
Before explaining the structure of the research, some explanation is required for the basic concepts 
dealt with in the dissertation, especially in relation to the research questions. 
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5.1 Expropriation and compensation 
In general, expropriation has social, economic and political aspects. During the last century it was 
closely tied to the process of decolonization, but today it is more tied to regulatory power of the 
state. When colonial countries got their full independence, their first action was to expropriate the 
properties of the monopolistic foreign companies that were supported by the old colonialist regime. 
This caused foreign investors to desire security for their investments. Foreign investors take major 
risks when investing in a country outside of their domicile. As mentioned above, one of the biggest 
risks these investors take is the possibility that the host state’s government expropriates or national-
izes their assets, thus depriving them of their investment. National investment protection laws of the 
investment recipient country might offer some protection. However, the problem with these laws is 
that they can be changed unilaterally by the host state. Thus, international instruments provide bet-
ter guarantee for investors. Such international instruments can be bilateral or multilateral treaties or 
the above mentioned international agreements between the investor and the host state. Therefore, 
foreign investors use these treaties to restrict the host state’s ability to expropriate (and of course, 
the host state voluntarily gives up its sovereignty in the specific field). 
Furthermore, distinction should be made between direct and indirect expropriation. Direct expropri-
ation occurs when the government takes or interferes with the property of a foreign investor, for ex-
ample in the transfer of title, seizure of assets, or expulsion from the state. Throughout history, this 
has typically occurred when countries decided to nationalize industries from the foreign investor, in 
favor of the government or a government-linked 3rd party.  
Indirect expropriation is more subjective as it can occur when measures taken by the host state lead 
to the foreign investor's property to lose significantly in value, or even deprivation of full manage-
ment, use, or control of their own assets. In the OECD's Working Paper on Indirect Expropriation 
and the Right to Regulate in International Investment Law, three criteria were formulated to deter-
mine indirect expropriation: 1. the degree of interference with the property right, 2. the character of 
governmental measures, i.e. the purpose and the context of the governmental measure, and 3. the 
interference of the measure with reasonable and investment-backed expectations. The degree of in-
terference with the property right is the starting point to assess the impact of a government action, 
and determine whether it meets the threshold of indirect expropriation. This requires the claimant to 
show that although they still have the legal title to their property, the rights to use their property 
have to be eroded as a result of the interference by the government. 
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Expropriation is legitimate, but only if it is in the public's interest, non-discriminatory, follows due 
process, and includes the payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. Any expropria-
tion, direct or indirect, that does not meet these requirements would constitute illegal expropriation 
under the Energy Charter Treaty, as well as customary international law. This is shown in the case 
of Santa Elena, where the ICSID Tribunal held that: “Expropriatory environmental measures – no 
matter how laudable and beneficial to society as a whole – are in this respect, similar to any other 
expropriatory measures that a state may take in order to implement its policies: where property is 
expropriated, even for environmental purposes, whether domestic or international, the state’s oblig-
ation to pay compensation remains.”  1
This means that a government's actions, no matter how noble or beneficial to the public, will still 
require the government to pay compensation if any kind of indirect expropriation occurs as a result 
of the action. On the other hand, in the case of Methanex, the Tribunal decided that: “ … as a matter 
of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted 
in accordance with due process and, which affects, inter alias, a foreign investor or investment is 
not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless specific commitments had been given by the 
regulating government to the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the gov-
ernment would refrain from such regulation.”  2
In general, there are three criteria that must be met for an expropriation to be lawful. First of all, 
public purpose. The requirement of the government measure being in the public's interest is defined 
differently by different treaties and tribunals. In the Canada-Colombia FTA (2008), it is stated in the 
footnote: “The term ‘public purpose’ is a concept of public international law and shall be interpreted 
in accordance with international law. Domestic law may express this or similar concepts using dif-
ferent terms, such as ‘social interest’, ‘public necessity’ or ‘public use’.”  3
Indeed, the definition of public interest, or public purpose, is a broad one but there are some specif-
ic guidelines. The government's actions must be in the public interest at the time when the expropri-
atory measure was taken. If the goal of the measure is not achieved, it can still be considered part of 
the public interest.  
	  <h$ps://www.italaw.com/cases/3413>	  accessed	  27	  December	  20181
	  <h$ps://www.italaw.com/cases/683>	  accessed	  27	  December	  20182
	  <h$ps://internaAonal.gc.ca/trade-­‐commerce/trade-­‐agreements-­‐accords-­‐commerciaux/agr-­‐acc/colombia-­‐colombie/3
Fa-­‐ale/background-­‐contexte.aspx?lang=eng>	  accessed	  27	  December	  2018
 9
However, if the expropriation took place, and the public interest purpose did not start until a later 
date, then it cannot be considered to have originally been for the public's interest, as seen in Siag 
and Vecchi v Egypt. In that case, expropriation occurred by the government due to delays in con-
struction of a project. Six years later, the property was transferred to another company for the pur-
pose of building an oil pipeline. The public purpose requirement was not met as the measure was 
not originally for a public purpose, but only at a later date became for a public purpose. 
The second requirement for lawful expropriation of property under international law is that it must 
be non-discriminatory. The expropriation is discriminatory if it is based on, linked to, or taken for 
reasons of the investor's nationality. Measures affecting only a portion of foreign nationals are not 
always considered discriminatory. There must be different treatment to different parties under the 
same measure. This can be seen in the case of Eureko v. Poland, where the Tribunal held that: “…
the measures taken by [Poland] in refusing to conduct the IPO [purchase of additional shares] are 
clearly discriminatory. As the Tribunal noted earlier, these measures have been proclaimed by suc-
cessive Ministers of the state Treasury as being pursued in order to keep PZU [the privatized state-
owned insurance company] under majority Polish control and to exclude foreign control such as 
that of Eureko. That discriminatory conduct by the Polish Government is blunt violation of the ex-
pectations of the Parties in concluding the SPA [Share Purchase Agreement] and the First Adden-
dum. “  4
Therefore, it can be concluded that non-discriminatory treatment requires that the government does 
not have a specific intention to expropriate from a certain nationality of foreign investors. 
The third requirement for lawful expropriation under international law is that it must be done under 
the due process of law. The due process principle means that (a) the expropriation complies with the 
procedures of the domestic law and internationally recognized rules, and (b) that the investor affect-
ed has an opportunity to have his case reviewed before an independent and impartial body. The ex-
propriation must be free from arbitrariness.  
Common examples of breach of due process would be if the expropriation has no legal (whether in 
law or procedure) basis to be ordered, or if the investor cannot rely on domestic courts or tribunals 
to hear its case impartially. The case of ADC v. Hungary gives a more comprehensive overview: 
“…‘due process of law’, in the expropriation context, demands an actual and substantive legal pro-
cedure for a foreign investor to raise its claims against the depriving actions already taken or about 
	  <h$ps://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/413>	  accessed	  27	  December	  20184
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to be taken against it. Some basic legal mechanisms, such as reasonable advance notice, a fair hear-
ing and an unbiased and impartial adjudicator to assess the actions in dispute, are expected to be 
readily available and accessible to the investor to make such legal procedure meaningful. In gener-
al, the legal procedure must be of a nature to grant an affected investor a reasonable chance within a 
reasonable time to claim its legitimate rights and have its claims heard. If no legal procedure of 
such nature exists at all, the argument that ‘the actions are taken under due process of law’ rings 
hollow.”  5
The last requirement to lawfully expropriate (besides the previous three) is that there must be pay-
ment of “prompt, adequate, and effective” compensation. This is the so-called Hull standard. The 
Hull standard was originally formulated to provide a more satisfactory and agreeable compensation 
for the investor, whereas the appropriate compensation formula favors the state, as other factors and 
considerations may be taken into account to lower the amount of compensation. Specific considera-
tions are rephrased as “just” or “appropriate” when the context is uncertain, such as the time frame 
of payment, the type of currency, and the transferability of the payment. 
5.2 Regulatory Chill 
The literature on regulatory chill is not consistent, and many researchers have developed particular 
notions of it, which are highly dependent on the field in which a researcher applies the concept. To 
put it in other words, environmentalists have developed and applied the concept of regulatory chill 
in terms of environmental studies, which is different from the policy related or investment related 
notions developed by political or legal scientists and researchers alike. In spite of this, it is possible 
to determine specific common and core elements that are common across the fields and use that to 
create a definition. 
In international investment law and public policy space, the concept of regulatory chill is believed 
to cause a negative effect on sustainable development. And hence it is understood to be restraining a 
nation or state from enacting some particular public policy measure or regulatory measure because 
of arbitration, or fear of arbitration, under the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) terms or pro-
visions, therefore constraining the state in terms of its rights to regulate. 
	  <h$ps://www.italaw.com/cases/41>	  accessed	  27	  December	  20185
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To understand regulatory chill, it is crucial to examine the essential ingredient, that is to say, the 
right of a state to regulate, especially, the right to regulate in relation to sustainable development. It 
has to be understood that all sovereign states have the right to regulate on their territory, and it is 
confirmed by international instruments like the Charter of the United Nations, where this is specifi-
cally recognized by Article 2(7) and 2(1). Examining sustainable development, it can be described 
as a normative principle, stating that it is an obligation of the state to manage the economic, natural, 
and social resources with the view that the same resources should be available to the present gener-
ation and future generations.  
Returning to the concept of regulatory chill, its common elements have been outlined by Shekhar : 6
alteration in the application of domestic laws and regulation; a new kind of standard; bona fide na-
ture of the laws or regulation (laws and regulations emphasize good faith); and fear or threat of arbi-
tration. It must also be noted that the emergence of regulatory chill in policy can never be uniform. 
It is important to note that the response of policy makers, who have acted in public interest, which 
might be against the interests of a particular group of investors, against certain developments in the 
investment arena can cause the below stipulated types of regulatory chill: 
Precedential chill: occurs when the policy makers respond to a finalized arbitration when consider-
ing future measures of public policy. 
Response chill: affecting a particular regulation after the policy makers have become aware of risks 
related to state-investor dispute settlement. 
Anticipatory chill: risk assessment that considers whether a future policy would result in state-in-
vestor disputes. 
6. Structure of the research 
In total, the author separated his dissertation into seven different chapters. In the first chapter, the 
author discussed the aim of the thesis, which also served the role of a traditional introduction to the 
work. Afterwards, the author went over the basics of the Energy Charter Treaty. In particular, he 
examined the history, evolution and aims of the Energy Charter Treaty, with focus on precedents 
	  Kates	  Robert	  W,	  Thomas	  M	  Parris	  and	  Anthony	  a	  Leiserowitz,	  ‘What	  is	  sustainable	  development?’	  	  (2005)	  Environ6 -­‐
ment	  47,	  no.	  3	  	  8.
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(such as the European Energy Charter), the formation of the Energy Charter Treaty itself, and fur-
ther developments. The author emphasized that the aim of the Energy Charter Treaty was funda-
mentally to satisfy mutual needs between parties (energy for importing countries, capital for export-
ing countries) and out of a general desire to create a new meaningful economic relationship between 
the West and the former Eastern Bloc, though the scope expanded significantly to include other de-
veloping countries as well. Some of the contracting parties to the treaty were detailed by the author 
next, with particular focus on Russia, who had several issues with the Energy Charter Treaty, espe-
cially in relation to transit. Finally, the author also addressed the structure of the Energy Charter 
Treaty in the first chapter. 
In the second chapter, the author focused on presenting and examining dispute settlement mecha-
nisms under the Energy Charter Treaty. First, he undertook a short comparative analysis of what 
makes investor-state dispute settlement (that appearsin the Energy Charter Treaty) different from 
the regular and typical international commercial arbitration regime. Afterwards, he went onto de-
tails regarding what the Energy Charter Treaty says about such investor-state disputes, before con-
cluding it with a short section on dispute settlement between the contracting parties themselves. 
In the third chapter, the author addressed some horizontal issues and examined the Energy Chapter 
Treaty from the perspective of energy exporting countries. He separated the group into contracting 
parties and non-contracting parties, with eight countries being examined in total. The author also 
attempted to conceptualize reasons and explain why these countries joined or did not join the Ener-
gy Charter Treaty, and whether the ECT has been beneficial to them or not. 
In the fourth chapter, the author addressed the promotion, protection and treatment of investments 
and the issues of expropriation and compensation. In particular, the author examined the concept of 
investment and investor, and their definitions under the Energy Charter Treaty. Secondly, he went 
over expropriation, with focus given to the conditions of lawful expropriation under international 
law and the definitions given in the Energy Charter Treaty. The author then examined the standard 
of compensation for expropriation in investment treaties in a descriptive manner, with the focus be-
ing once more on the Energy Charter Treaty. Finally, in the second half of the chapter, the author 
examined in-depth the case law related to Articles 10 and 13 of the Energy Charter Treaty, and thus 
the case law relevant to the issue of expropriation. 
In the fifth chapter, after laying the groundwork in the previous four chapters, the author sought to 
answer the three research questions. Whether the Energy Charter Treaty sufficiently guarantees the 
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protection of foreign in-vestments, and if so, to what extent? Whether the compensation paid under 
the Energy Charter Treaty is comparable to international practice? Whether the Energy Charter 
Treaty has a “regulatory chill” effect? In the first case, the author examined the situation before the 
Energy Charter Treaty briefly, before approaching relevant articles from a different direction than in 
the previous chapter, and analyzed the existing arbitral practice. In the second, the author separated 
his work into two segments: first, he examined compensation from a theoretical perspective, then 
sought to compare raw data between general international practice and the Energy Charter Treaty, 
with regards to success rate of claiming compensation and how much compensation is typically 
claimed, and rewarded by arbitration. And for the third question, the author examined regulatory 
chill and treaty law, the right to regulate, or the interplay between public policy issues and investor 
protection, and the overall recipe for regulatory chill. 
In the sixth chapter, the author addressed Iraq’s position in the energy sector from an investment 
protection perspective, with specific focus on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and its domestic law on 
investment. 
Finally, in the seventh chapter, the author summarized his answers to the three research questions 
and addressed the central premise, that is: whether the Energy Charter Treaty would be a beneficial 
arrangement for Iraq and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in particular. 
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II. New Scientific Results 
This section will be broken up into four parts: the answers to each specific research question, and 
the general results and conclusions of the thesis. 
1. Whether the Energy Charter Treaty guarantees the protection of foreign investments, and if so, to 
what extent? 
After the author’s examination of the question, he concluded that the Energy Charter Treaty plays 
an important role in the settlement of disputes in the energy sector. The disputes that arise in the en-
ergy sector will likely thus remain a subject of international arbitration for a long period. The de-
mand for energy has been increasing globally, due to which foreign investment has become much 
more crucial to the development and the exploration of the states in possession of abundant energy 
resources. In this regard, the Energy Charter Treaty may provide a stable framework that also offers 
compulsory protection for the investors of other countries. 
The Energy Charter Treaty has the ability to provide significant capital and advantages to the coun-
tries that have interests in the trade of energy products. It can also be said that the presence of the 
Energy Charter Treaty may have the ability to provide security to the investor of other countries. 
The Energy Charter Treaty can also provide resolutions for disputes between contracting parties, or 
disputes concerning foreign investors of contracting parties. The treatment standards of the Energy 
Charter Treaty have much resemblance to the practice established by the World Trade Organization, 
which provides a strong basis for this Treaty. The Energy Charter Treaty also provides protection to 
investors. This protection closely resembles the protection provided by Bilateral Investment 
Treaties. This is evidenced by the use of the Hull standard for compensation, or by the dispute reso-
lution process in Article 26. 
Furthermore, the theoretical protection provided by the Energy Charter Treaty is reinforced by the 
actual arbitral practice. Based on the findings of the author, the arbitral tribunals interpreting the 
Energy Charter Treaty tend towards a balanced approach, leveraging the correct extent of protec-
tion, especially in relation to questions of expropriation. 
Therefore, the author can conclude that the Energy Charter Treaty definitely provides protection to 
foreign investments both in theory and actual practice. The real extent of this protection seems sub-
ject to change, as the theoretical extent can be considered average, no lesser or greater than the ex-
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tent provided by other similar international treaties, while the arbitral practice shows different levels 
of strictness, based on what is appropriate in the given case. 
2.	  Whether the compensation paid under the Energy Charter Treaty is comparable to international 
practice? 
The answer is twofold, depending on the perspective. When it comes to the theoretical framework, 
the author observes that the Energy Charter Treaty does not follow the lead of international custom-
ary law, and lacks its more nuanced approach to compensation. Of course, it cannot be said that the 
tribunals would not consider such elements when arbitrating and interpreting the Energy Charter 
Treaty, but it is still not explicitly present. The concept of direct and indirect expropriation, the dif-
ferentiation between compensation for lawful and wrongful expropriation, etc. are all missing from 
the Energy Charter Treaty. However, in this regard, it is quite similar to BITs (despite their syn-
chrony with general international practice), which are today the most common source of investment 
arbitration, and can be considered ‘trendsetters’ in investment protection. By this logic, the Energy 
Charter Treaty is not much different from other investment-related international treaties, at least in 
connection with how compensation is formulated by its provisions. 
The practical analysis of the data supports this position. Neither the ‘win rate’ of foreign investors, 
nor the claimed and awarded compensation deviates significantly from the current norms of invest-
ment arbitration practice. Obviously, as mentioned before, there are some outliers that are dispro-
portionate and distort some numbers, but they cannot be considered the decisive factor. Yukos (the 
most important outlier), despite the importance of the cases attached to it, is still just a fringe case. 
Therefore, the Energy Charter Treaty is extremely similar to standard international practice in both 
theory and actual application. It can be considered a typical example of modern investment protec-
tion when it comes to compensation. It follows the same trends and norms that the other treaties do. 
3. Whether the Energy Charter Treaty has a “regulatory chill” effect? 
Based on the author’s findings, the primary goal of Energy Charter Treaty is geared towards ensur-
ing that investments in energy are protected using international standards. The result of this is that 
the Energy Charter Treaty can have a huge impact on regulations touching on the environment and 
policies in many EU states including Germany, Italy, and Spain. This is true for those regulations 
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which have a negative impact on the foreign investors, and they can be put under litigation in the 
international tribunals and challenged on the grounds of ‘fair and equitable treatment', or an in-
vestor can seek compensation for indirect expropriation. This causes a permanent tension between 
public welfare interest and investor rights under the Energy Charter Treaty. In principle, the arbitral 
tribunal can consider public welfare in its determination, but the investor-state arbitration is focused 
mainly on the interests of the investor, and hence the investor-state dispute is used as a tool for 
shielding the investors from political risks. 
In that regard, the rights given to foreign investors in many countries are higher and more demand-
ing. In fact, in countries like Germany, Spain, and Italy, it has been argued that rights under the En-
ergy Charter Treaty surpass the protection of the national law like in the case of German Basic Law, 
which stipulates a balance of public interest and the state's role as a guarantor that these rights are 
well-balanced. 
If an investor starts an action and the arbitral tribunal decides that the investor protection rights and 
standards under Energy Charter Treaty have been infringed, a particular state can be required to pay 
a hefty amount in terms of compensation. These mere threats of a claim of arbitration cause states 
to roll back on its intended promulgation of environmental standards, regulatory measures to protect 
the ecosystem and the environment. This kind of effect, a pre-emptive action, acts as a benefit to the 
foreign investors but to the detriment of the common good (chilling effect). 
The author has shown that even if a state has two competing obligations, one under the EU law and 
one under the Energy Charter Treaty, the Energy Charter Treaty obligations would primarily take 
the leading position, as in the case of Germany. The selective application is also another manifesta-
tion of regulatory chill under the Energy Charter Treaty, as states are more likely to apply legisla-
tions in a selective manner favoring the foreign energy investors at the expense of its national law, 
to avoid arbitral proceedings and the payment of hefty compensation. 
. Even though jurisprudence is developing, and some nations have favored applying their legisla-
tions selectively, the future of Energy Charter Treaty holds a high chance of regulatory chill given 
the conflict between the Energy Charter Treaty itself, the environmental conservation policy and 
laws in the EU. 
However, regulatory chill is not easy to prove, and requires a significant length of time be-fore its 
effects can be measured. In any case, it is the task of decision-makers to ensure that the public inter-
est is protected from international corporate and other business interests, which requires a clear 
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commitment to pursuing public interest over economic gains and reject the chilling effect caused by 
the factors discussed in this part of the thesis. 
4. General findings 
Deciding whether the ECT was  an advantage for energy exporting countries is a difficult task. As 
shown by the theoretical framework, the case law, and the practical considerations from the per-
spective of energy exporters, the Energy Charter Treaty’s effects are difficult to gauge and are ex-
tremely multi-faceted. Therefore, in the author’s opinion, the sensible solution would be for each 
energy exporting country considering becoming a contracting party in the Energy Charter Treaty, to 
weigh the specific advantages and dis-advantages of the Treaty before committing to it or abstain-
ing. The given country might have a dire need of foreign investment, or it might have enough do-
mestic capital or possesses other attractive factors to draw in investors. Transit might have already 
been solved, or it might be an urgent question. The question of whether  the country is confident in 
its ability to enforce its sovereignty over its natural resources arises. These issues must be individu-
ally considered before the country makes its decision. 
In the author’s opinion, the Energy Charter Treaty cannot be simply classified as either a truly bene-
ficial treaty, nor can it be dismissed as something chiefly concerned with serving the interests of 
energy importing developed countries. Instead, the author urges all readers to see the Energy Char-
ter Treaty with all its nuances, with both the potential benefits and hindrances it can bring to an en-
ergy exporting country. It is impossible to draw a general conclusion about the overall effects of the 
Treaty; therefore, specific conclusions must be drawn on a country-by-country basis. 
As outlined in the previous section, it was one of the primary issues during the author’s research to 
find out  what can be concluded in connection with Iraq, and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in specif-
ic. As mentioned in the dissertation, Iraq, after its opening to the world economy, has significant 
energy resources, but is reliant on procuring foreign investment to develop proper exporting capa-
bilities. As it has been reiterated multiple times, the most important factor for foreign investors is 
stability and legal guarantees that are actually enforced. When it comes to domestic law, as previ-
ously mentioned, Iraq’s law is still far too inadequate to assuage the concerns of the investors. Fur-
thermore, neither Iraqi law nor the Kurdistan Region’s Law on Investment provides much when it 
comes to expropriation. And as we can see from the dissertation, expropriation is an overpowering 
concern for foreign investors. 
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Another issue that arises in relation to the Kurdistan Region, is transit, as mentioned in the introduc-
tion. Pipelines coming from the Kurdistan Region must necessarily go through Turkey, and thus ex-
porters are reliant on Turkey’s goodwill, in lieu of proper treaties.  
Thus, the adoption of the Energy Charter Treaty would be highly beneficial for Iraq for multiple 
reasons. First of all, it would create a strong legal guarantee for foreign investors seeking to invest 
in the area. In lieu of proper domestic law, the various articles that were discussed in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 could provide the necessary legal framework that foreign investors would feel comfort-
able with. And to be specific, the Energy Charter Treaty explicitly deals with the issue of expropria-
tion, and thus its adoption would patch up a significant legal abscess in Iraqi law, and in a manner 
that is not only satisfactory, but also attractive to foreign investors (as mentioned in the thesis be-
fore, foreign investors typically consider international treaties more potent and secure than domestic 
laws, especially when it comes to developing countries). 
And when it comes to the Kurdistan Region, the adoption of the Energy Charter Treaty would not 
only alleviate the inadequacies of the region’s Law on Investment (that is discussed in Chapter 6), 
especially in regards to expropriation, it would also solve the issue of transit. As discussed at great 
length in Chapter 5, the Energy Charter Treaty provides provisions for transit disputes and issues. If 
Iraq, and by extension, the Kurdistan Region, becomes a contracting party of the Energy Charter 
Treaty, it would be able to use these transit provisions to protect itself against any potential prob-
lems caused by Turkey (which, as mentioned in the introduction, is a contracting party of the Ener-
gy Charter Treaty). Not only Turkey would be forced to respect the various principles of transit that 
are discussed in Chapter 5, it would also provide the Kurdistan Region with access to an effective 
and secure method of transit dispute resolution that Turkey would have to acquiesce to as a con-
tracting party of the Energy Charter Treaty. 
Thus, it can be stated without uncertainty that for Iraq, and the Kurdistan Region in specific, the 
Energy Charter Treaty would be a significant boon. It would not only boost the progress of econom-
ic development through attracting foreign investors, it would also lead to a more cohesive and se-
cure relationship with nearby transit countries (Turkey, to be specific) that are contracting parties of 
the Energy Charter Treaty. 
To conclude this section, the author believes that further integration in the field of energy law is 
imminent and inevitable. As the global economic relations strengthen, more and more integration 
and cooperation will be required to feed the ever-growing energy demands of the globe. The Energy 
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Charter Treaty can be considered an early forerunner of these intentions, and the legacy of which 
will be continued by such documents and events as the Road Map for the Modernization of the En-
ergy Charter Process or the International Energy Charter. These remain reliant on the Energy Char-
ter Treaty, and cannot be considered its true successors, but they represent the future that is to come. 
Further research on the subject should prove bountiful in a decade or so, as the speed of the integra-
tion greatly fluctuates. 
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